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THERE IS A THERE THERE:  HOW THE ZIPPO SLIDING SCALE HAS 
DESTABILIZED THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Catherine Ross Dunham* 
 
A classic is classic not because it conforms to certain structural 
rules, or fits certain definitions … It is classic because of a certain 
eternal and irrepressible freshness.  Edith Wharton 
 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  HOW ZIPPO AND ITS PROGENY HAVE DESTABILIZED PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS 
 
In 1997, the Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania evaluated one in a line of emerging personal jurisdiction cases 
that raised the question of whether Internet-based contacts with citizens of 
the forum state can alone establish the defendant purposefully availed 
himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state.    In this unlikely 
watershed case, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,1 the District Court 
wrangled with the new concept of purposeful availment through electronic 
contact with the forum state.  The court viewed Zippo and its antecedents as 
                                                 
* Catherine Ross Dunham is an Associate Professor of Law at the Elon University 
School of Law.  The author would like to thank her research assistant, Heather Quinn, for 
her invaluable assistance researching this article. 
1 Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa 
1997). 
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components of a new body of personal jurisdiction law: Internet-based 
personal jurisdiction.  In Zippo, the District Court created a new test, the 
Zippo sliding scale, to evaluate the purposeful availment issue when the 
defendant’s contacts are based on Internet conduct.  Many courts then 
followed Zippo’s impulse to categorize Internet-based contacts differently 
than other contacts and applied the sliding scale to a variety of cases 
possessing the common thread of Internet activity.   
Zippo and its progeny raise the question of to what extent the law should 
customize doctrine to address the practical changes created by technological 
advances. Courts now stand in a similar position to Courts at the turn of the 
Twentieth Century when the country struggled with the realities of 
industrialization and cross-country travel.  Through Pennoyer,2 then later 
through International Shoe,3 courts mediated the tensions between national 
growth and the tradition of territoriality through tests based on a defendant’s 
contacts with the forum, rather than a defendant’s physical presence in the 
forum.  Territoriality, or place, served as the foundation of Twentieth 
Century personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and the use of a minimum 
contacts analysis formed the analytical structure.   
Tensions exist between the role of contacts based on Internet activity 
and the foundation and structure created through theories based on place. 
                                                 
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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The Zippo sliding scale was the Federal District Court’s response to the 
tension created by the perceived amelioration of place as a determinant of 
contacts and purposeful availment. The Zippo approach responded to a 
rising fear that if entities are able to contact citizens of the forum through 
the Internet alone, those contacts will fail the test of minimum contacts 
because Internet-based contacts can be disseminated so widely, purposeful 
availment with any particular forum is non-existent.   
This article argues judicial responses such as the Court’s response in 
Zippo constitute premature, non-functional and destabilizing reactions to 
Internet-based contacts analysis. First, the article argues the Zippo sliding 
scale has destabilized the foundation of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
by directing courts to analyze the defendant’s contacts by reference to a 
linear scale which serves as a non-functional addition on the existing 
foundation. The article further argues the hasty construction of Zippo 
creates a new need to shore up the established framework of contacts 
analysis based on the place theory directives of International Shoe 
andPennoyer. Finally, the article evaluates how place theory fits in the 
modern context through the hypothetical analysis of a case wherein a 
defendant’s only contacts with the forum are through Internet-based 
activity. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
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A.  THE ROLE OF PLACE IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS 
 
Throughout this article, I will refer to the visual image of a house, 
offered as a metaphor for personal jurisdiction analysis.  The house is not an 
elaborate mansion, but a small frame structure built on a subterranean stone 
foundation.  It is a stable, functional, traditional house, common to many 
American neighborhoods in the middle part of the Twentieth Century.  And, 
as with any structure, the house began with a foundation. 
Personal jurisdiction analysis is the offspring of procedural due process 
and really came into being in American Jurisprudence after the application 
of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the adoption and ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4  In fact, the foundation for modern personal 
jurisdiction analysis was laid before the Fourteenth Amendment applied the 
due process clause to the states.5  In the latter part of the Nineteenth 
Century, the courts began to adjust to the birth of a mobile American 
society.6  Prior to the era of industrialization and the meshing of cross-
country connections through a transcontinental railroad, American dispute 
resolution was local.7  The Anglo-based procedures and customs were 
                                                 
4 The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed June 13, 1866 and ratified on July 28, 
1868.  The history of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is described in 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).   
5 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714. 
6 See Philip L. Merkel, The Origins of an Expanded Federal Court Jurisdiction:  
Railroad Development and the Ascendancy of the Federal Judiciary, THE BUSINESS 
HISTORY REVIEW, Vol. 58, No., 3 (Autumn, 1984), 336-358. 
7 See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism:  Reconstruction and the Waite 
Court, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, Vol. 1978 (1978) 39-79. 
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nurtured in American courts and much civil dispute still relied on face-to-
face resolution before a judge.8  Not until the nation stretched from east to 
west did the courts face the challenge of determining proper procedural due 
process when one party did not reside within the forum state. 
Pennoyer was the first United States Supreme Court response to the 
challenge of a more mobile society.9  In Pennoyer, the original landowner, 
Neff, moved from Washington State to California, leaving behind a parcel 
of land and a debt owed to his lawyer.10  Neff’s lawyer filed suit against 
Neff for a $300 fee bill and sought a post-judgment seizure of Neff’s land in 
order to satisfy the judgment.11  Neff’s land was sold to Neff’s lawyer for 
$300 through a Sheriff’s sale without notice to Neff.12  The land was later 
re-sold to Pennoyer.13  When Neff returned to Washington, he filed suit to 
quiet title to his land, relying in part on a theory that he was deprived of 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714. 
10 Id. at 717.  Marcus Neff hired an attorney, John H. Mitchell, to help him with 
paperwork for a land grant. Mitchell later sued Neff in the Oregon state court system for 
unpaid bills; Neff was living in California and unaware of the proceedings.  Mitchell won 
the lawsuit by default judgment. When Mitchell won the lawsuit in February 1866, Neff's 
land grant hadn't yet been conferred. Mitchell, possibly waiting for the arrival of the grant, 
waited until July 1866 to get a writ of attachment on the property. The court later ordered 
the land seized and sold in order to pay the judgment. Mitchell bought the land at that very 
auction and later sold the land for approximately $15,000 and transferred the title to 
Sylvester Pennoyer. In 1874, Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court to recover his land. The 
trial court held in favor of Neff and Pennoyer appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  
RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 50 (2006). 
11 Freer, supra note 10. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
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procedural due process when the sale was made without notice to him.14 
Although this case is most cited for its definitional distinctions 
regarding in rem and in personam jurisdiction, a more interesting and less 
explored attribute of the case is its illustration of the changing tensions in 
American life.  Neff left the state, thus leaving his property.15  When his 
creditor filed suit on a debt owed, the very practical question of notice and 
jurisdiction necessarily arose.16  Although Pennoyer post-dates the 
intercontinental railroad and falls in the midst of the Industrial Revolution, 
efficient means of communication were not developed in the far west of 
Washington and California.17  In fact, the travel distance between Neff and 
his property could not easily be negotiated and mail service as we know it 
today was not an existing option.18  The creditor’s best option was to seek in 
rem jurisdiction over Neff predicated on his real property, thus the Court 
made a bold statement toward progress when it failed to uphold the original 
judgment against Neff based on the plaintiff’s failure to identify Neff’s 
property at the outset of the litigation.19  Of course, the error is more than 
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 
THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, Vol. 1965 (1965), 241-288. 
18 See supra note 6. 
19 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 721-722.  “…every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”  Id. at 722.  A state has power 
over people and things inside its boundaries.  Such power is demonstrated by the fact that 
the courts of the state can seize people and property found within the state.  Thus, 
California has power over people and things inside California, and Oregon cannot exercise 
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just one of timing and, as the Court asserts, the failure to identify the 
property at the outset of the litigation deprives the defendant of pre-
judgment notice, thus failing to provide a basis for the court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over Neff, leading to an invalid judgment.20  However, and 
perhaps more boldly, the Court in Pennoyer laid the foundation for a 
territorial idea of personal jurisdiction. 
The Court’s decision reflects the Post-Civil War climate of Pennoyer 
and the new American tension around the idea of individual states and 
territoriality.21  Before Pennoyer, territoriality ruled the civil process.22  In 
Pennoyer, the court wrestles with that tension and ultimately incorporates 
the traditions of territoriality into a modern era of Fourteenth Amendment 
due process.23Pennoyer mediated the tension when upholding the value of 
territoriality by affirming quasi in rem jurisdiction as a proper jurisdictional 
predicate for a valid judgment while requiring the plaintiff to notify the 
defendant that the land will serve as the jurisdictional basis of the suit at the 
outset of the litigation.24 
                                                                                                                            
authority over such people or things.  See also Freer, supra note 10 at 55. 
20 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 722. 
21 See supra note 7. 
22 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 723(quoting Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. 
Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464). 
23 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 721-722.  See also Freer, supra note 10 at 55, supra note 4. 
24 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 725-726.  “…if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no 
service of process on him, the case becomes in its essential nature a proceeding in rem, the 
only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the demand which 
the court may find to be due to the plaintiff.  That such is the nature of this proceeding…”  
Id. 
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The Court’s value of territoriality forms the foundation of modern 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  Despite the emerging tensions of 
growth, the Court required some contact with the territory as a basis for 
personal jurisdiction.25  Thus, after Pennoyer, the stone foundation of the 
metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction was complete.  Despite growing 
mobility, the defendant’s “place” would be a factor in determining the 
court’s power over that person. 
The structure of the metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction was 
built in the middle of the Twentieth Century, framed with the new test of 
“minimum contacts.”26   In 1942, the Supreme Court analyzed personal 
jurisdiction involving that most mobile of the new Americans: the traveling 
salesman.   In International Shoe v. Washington, the Court evaluated the 
power courts in the State of Washington had over a company who reached 
the forum state only through its sales people.27  The International Shoe 
                                                 
25 Id. at 721-722. 
26 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  See 4 Fed. Prac. & 
Proc. Civ.3d § 1067.  “…International Shoe became a watershed case that redefined the 
constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction and, indirectly, the principles of 
personal jurisdiction, almost completely.” 
27 Id. at 310.  The plaintiff, responsible for filing this suit in the State of Washington, 
established a tax on employers doing business therein. The "tax" was a mandatory 
contribution to the state's Unemployment Compensation Fund. The defendant, International 
Shoe, was a company that was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of 
business in Missouri. The corporation had maintained for some time a staff of 11-13 
salesmen in Washington who were residents of that state, and who occasionally rented 
space to put up displays, as well as met with prospective customers in motels and hotels, 
thus having no permanent "situs" of business in the State. International Shoe did not pay 
the tax, so the state effected service of process on one of their salesmen with a notice of 
assessment. Washington also sent a letter by registered mail to their place of business in 
Missouri. International Shoe made a special appearance at the trial court to dispute the 
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Company manufactured shoes in St. Louis, Missouri.28  It employed 
salesmen who resided in the state of Washington.29  International Shoe did 
not own any land in the state of Washington, but occasionally rented rooms 
for the purpose of displaying shoes.30  Salesmen had no authority to accept 
purchase offers; rather, they forwarded the offers to buy shoes to St. Louis, 
where all decisions were made.31  Although the defendant company sold 
shoes in Washington, the defendant, through its salesperson, had no real 
presence in the forum state.32  The State argued, however, that the defendant 
should be subject to personal jurisdiction within the forum state because it 
sells its product in the state and thus enjoys the benefits and protections of 
Washington state law.33  The Court responded to this basic question of 
presence and personal jurisdiction by creating the “minimum contacts” test, 
                                                                                                                            
state's jurisdiction over it as a corporate "person." Personal jurisdiction was upheld in the 
trial court and the Supreme Court of Washington, so International Shoe Co. appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Freer, supra note 10, at 69.  The International Shoe Company paid its salesmen on 
commission.  Additionally, it permitted salesmen to show only one shoe of a pair; the 
argument was that by failing to ship an entire pair, the company was not really doing 
business in Washington.  Id. 
31 Id.  The International Shoe Company argued that by structuring the business in this 
manner, the company was not subject to jurisdiction in Washington.  Additionally, the 
shoes were shipped “f.o.b.” from St. Louis.  This means “free on board,” which requires 
the purchaser to pay the freight charges to get the shoes from St. Louis.  Thus, International 
Shoe argued it did not ship anything into Washington and again reasoned that it should not 
be subject to jurisdiction there. 
32 Id. at 314.  See also supra notes 27, 30, and 31. 
33Id. at 320.  “… the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of 
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous 
throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in 
the course of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, 
including the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation 
which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities.”  
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thus creating the modern standard for personal jurisdiction analysis.34  The 
test, in its infancy, instructed that if a defendant had “minimum contacts” 
with the forum state such that he availed himself of the benefits and 
protections of the forum state’s laws, he would be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the forum state.35 
The “minimum contacts” test forms the basic structure of the 
metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction.  Through the years, the 
structure has been refined and up-fitted with more detailed interpretations of 
the test, including the development of sub-tests for purposeful availment 
through contracting and placing products into the stream of 
commerce.36However, throughout these refinements and the many to 
follow, the Court has relied on the same basic concept held dear in 
Pennoyer: territoriality.37The very essence of the minimum contacts test is 
an evaluation of the defendant’s physical contacts within the forum state.  
The analysis typically turns on the quality and nature of these contacts 
demonstrated through sale revenues from products sold in the state, points 
of destination for products shipped into the state, faxes, electronic mail and 
                                                 
34Id. at 310.  For cases demonstrating the living nature of the test see Asahi Metal 
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462 (1985);  Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).                      
35 International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
36 See e.g. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger 
King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
37 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 721-722; see also supra note 19. 
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telephone calls placed to individuals within the forum state, and other fact-
based mechanisms for assessing the defendant’s contact with the forum.38  
Although modern life has afforded more opportunities for individuals to 
contact the forum state without being physically present in the state, the test 
still relies on the very physical notion of contact.  Thus, minimum contacts 
analysis is rooted in place, just as the Court’s analysis was in Pennoyer, and 
the metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction is framed upon a 
longstanding theory of territoriality, a place theory of personal jurisdiction. 
B. TENSIONS CREATED BY INTERNET-BASED CONTACTS 
The importance of place has been challenged by an increasing digital 
world.  The house of personal jurisdiction began to feel crowded in the 
1990s when national businesses began to use the Internet as a base for 
commerce.39  New methods of digital business increased the accessibility of 
information and materials and expanded our ability to interact nationally 
and internationally.40  With the frame structure of minimum contacts 
bursting at the seams, courts began to plan and ultimately build an addition 
onto the metaphorical house to accommodate digital commerce.  
Unfortunately, the addition was built without adequate consideration of the 
                                                 
38 See e.g. Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Silver Ring Splint 
co. v. Digisplint, Inc., 508 F.Supp.2d 508 (W.D.Va., 2007); Taltwell, LLC v. Zonet USA 
Corp., Slip Copy, 2007 WL 4562874, (E.D.Va, 2007); Sostre v. Leslie, Slip Copy, 2008 
WL 245837 (D.R.I., Jan 04, 2008). 
39 See generally Janet Abbate, Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet, 
THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Spring, 2001) 147-176. 
40 Id. 
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underlying structure and the integrity of the framing, leaving an awkward 
add-on to the frame structure that fails to add function and threatens the 
foundational integrity of the entire house. 
The renovation planning began in 1996 when federal courts addressed 
the role of the Internet in three trademark infringement cases.41  In 
Bensusan v. Kingd/b/a The Blue Note, a New York restaurateur brought a 
trademark infringement suit against the operator of an Internet web site 
which shared the restaurant’s famous name.42  The court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction noting that 
the web site operator did not make any effort to use the Internet to reach out 
to New York, the forum state.43  Rather, the site derived revenue from 
substantially local sources, rather than sources in New York or national 
sources.44In addition to offering now quaint explanations of such new 
                                                 
41 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v, King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); CompuServe 
Inc v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
42 Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 297 (1996).  The Plaintiff’s New York club and the 
Defendant’s Internet site both had the name “The Blue Note”.  The defendant’s site 
advertises a nightclub in Columbia, Missouri that serves Columbia residents almost 
exclusively, mostly Univ. of Missouri students.  The Missouri club created a site on the 
Internet advertising the club in Missouri, which gave information about the club, an events 
calendar, and ticketing information.  The ticketing information included the names and 
contact information of ticket outlets in Columbia, Missouri and a charge-by-phone 
telephone number through which tickets could be ordered and picked up at the club.   
43 The Court, in distinguishing this case from the almost simultaneous decision from 
the Sixth Circuit in CompuServe, found that the facts of this case did not demonstrate the 
defendant “reached out” from Missouri to New York.  The Court held “[t]his action … 
contains no allegations that King in any way directed any contact to, or had any contact 
with, New York or intended to avail itself of any of New York’s benefits.” Id at 301. 
44 The Court notes that no goods were shipped from Missouri to New York and the 
defendant did not earn any revenues from New York residents. Id. at 299. 
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concepts as “site”45 and “Internet”46, the court in Bensusan importantly 
identifies that Internet activity can have a passive or active character, 
determined by the site operator’s ability to foresee the site would be 
accessed by users in other geographical regions.47 
Also in 1996, the federal appeals court for the Sixth Circuit addressed 
the question of minimum contacts through the Internet in CompuServe v. 
Patterson.48  In CompuServe, the plaintiff CompuServe filed a declaratory 
judgment action in the federal district court in Ohio against the defendant, a 
CompuServe subscriber, to settle defendant’s allegations that CompuServe 
had infringed on defendant’s software trademarks.49   The District Court 
dismissed the action, finding that the defendant had not purposefully availed 
                                                 
45 “A ‘site’ is an Internet address which permits users to exchange digital information 
with a particular host … and the World Wide Web refers to the collection of sites available 
on the Internet. Id. at 297. 
46 “The Internet is the world’s largest computer network (a network consisting of two 
or more computers linked together to share electronic mail or files).  The Internet is 
actually a network of thousands of independent networks, containing several million ‘host’ 
computers that provide information services.  An estimated 25 million individuals have 
some form of Internet access, and this audience is doubling each year. …” Id. 
47 The Court uses the existing tenet of foreseeability to delineate between the passive 
and active nature of Internet sites; “… mere foreseeability of an in-state consequence and a 
failure to avert that consequence is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 
300. 
48 CompuServe Inc v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
49 Id. CompuServe addressed the business relationship between defendant Patterson, a 
Texas domiciliary, and plaintiff CompuServe, an Ohio corporation that provided 
subscribers access to more than 1700 information services on the Internet.  The defendant 
entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for plaintiff to market and sell defendant’s 
electronic programs, referred to as “shareware”, to other subscribers.  The defendant 
claimed plaintiff had stolen the design of his shareware products and marketed them under 
the CompuServe name.  When the parties could not resolve the dispute, the plaintiff filed a 
declaratory judgment action.  The defendant then moved the court to dismiss the case for 
lack of personal jurisdiction in Ohio.  The district court dismissed the case and the plaintiff 
appealed. 
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himself of the benefits and privileges of Ohio law.50  The plaintiff appealed, 
arguing, among other points, that the defendant had purposefully availed 
himself of Ohio law through the process of entering into a contract with the 
plaintiff for the sale and marketing of “shareware” to CompuServe 
subscribers.  The Sixth Circuit agreed with CompuServe, noting that 
Patterson knowingly made an effort and purposefully contracted to market 
his product nationally, with CompuServe’s Ohio operations serving as his 
distribution center.51  The Sixth Circuit considered the case to present a 
“novel question of first impression” regarding the sufficiency of electronic 
contacts under the Due Process Clause analysis of personal jurisdiction.52  
However, the Court reasoned the case through the lens of a contract-based 
jurisdiction inquiry.53  Despite grand allusions to the Internet as “the latest 
                                                 
50 Id. at 1260-61.  The district court held that the electronic links between the 
defendant Patterson, who is a Texan, and Ohio, where CompuServe is headquartered, were 
“too tenuous to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” The district court also denied 
CompuServe's motion for reconsideration. 
51 Id. at 1263. 
52 Id. at 1262.  The Court stated the issue as “[d]id CompuServe make a prima facie 
showing that Patterson’s contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in 
nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, to support the district court’s exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over him?” 
53 The CompuServe Court asserted that a defendant does not have to be physically 
present in the forum state to satisfy the requirements of purposefully availment. The Court 
cited Burger King; “‘So long as a commercial actor's efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ 
toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence 
of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 
476.’” Id. at 1263.  Further, the CompuServe Court reasoned, “the defendant consciously 
reached out from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, and to use its service to 
market his computer software on the Internet. He entered into a contract which expressly 
stated that it would be governed by and construed in light of Ohio law. Ohio has written 
and interpreted its long-arm statute, and particularly its “transacting business” subsection, 
with the intent of reaching as far as the Due Process Clause will allow, and it certainly has 
an interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents.  As the Burger King 
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and greatest manifestation of [these] historical, globe-shrinking trends”54, 
the Court again relied on the imbedded concept of forseeability to find the 
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.55  Thus, despite the 
defendant’s lack of any other contact with the forum state, the act of 
reaching out into Ohio electronically satisfied the Due Process 
requirements.56 
The third case57 in the trilogy of trademark infringement cases which led 
to the addition on the house of personal jurisdiction also found the 
defendant subject to the forum state’s jurisdiction through the lens of 
traditional minimum contacts analysis.58  However, as in Bensusan59 and 
CompuServe,60 the District Court in Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc. bolstered the 
importance of the case around the newness of the Internet, again identifying 
                                                                                                                            
Corp. Court noted, the purposeful direction of one's activities toward a state has always 
been significant in personal jurisdiction cases, particularly where individuals purposefully 
derive benefits from interstate activities. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472-73.”  Id. at 
1266. 
54 Id. at 1262.  “The Internet represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of 
these historical, globe-shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right equipment and 
knowledge-that is, people like Patterson-to operate an international business cheaply, and 
from a desktop. That business operator, however, remains entitled to the protection of the 
Due Process Clause, which mandates that potential defendants be able ‘to structure their 
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where the conduct will and will not 
render them liable to suit.’ World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. 
Thus, this case presents a situation where we must reconsider the scope of our 
jurisdictional reach.” 
55 Id. at 1265. (“Patterson deliberately set in motion an ongoing marketing relationship 
with CompuServe, and he should have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have 
consequences in Ohio.”) 
56 See id. at 1266.  
57 Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp 1328 (E.D. Mo 1996). 
58 Id.   
59 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
60 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
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the personal jurisdiction question as an issue of first impression.61  The 
Court labeled the Internet as an entirely new means of information 
exchange and found that analogies to cases involving mail and telephone 
contacts inapposite based on the ability of electronic mail to efficiently 
reach a global audience.62  The subtext of the District Court’s opinion is a 
reticence to accept the advent of electronic communication and an unspoken 
fear of this new medium of commercial communication.63  Despite this 
reticence, the Court sets out and follows the Eighth Circuit’s five-prong test 
for measuring minimum contacts, focusing the analysis on the nature and 
quality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.64 
Two points of influence flow from the District Court’s decision in 
                                                 
61  Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332.  The Court frames the issue as follows: “Whether 
maintaining a website, such as the one maintained by Cybergold, which can be accessed by 
any internet user, and which appears to be maintained for the purpose of, and in 
anticipation of, being accessed and used by any and all internet users, including those 
residing in Missouri, amounts to promotional activities or active solicitations such as to 
provide the minimum contacts necessary for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident corporation, presents an issue of first impression to this Court.”  In similar 
language to that used in Bensusan and CompuServe, the Maritz Court highlights the new 
and mysterious character of the Internet and electronic communication and suggests the 
Internet raises new questions of due process.  
62 Id. at 1332.  The Court notes that electronic mail differs from posted mail in its 
efficiency and reach and different from an 800 number telephone contact scheme because 
the use of an Internet site puts the operator in immediate contact with interested persons, 
whereas the use of an 800 number requires the operator to advertise the number, then 
having interested persons call in to the operator). See also Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction 
Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
63 Id. at 1330; The Court defines the terms “Internet” and “information superhighway”, 
describing CyberGold’s web service as an example of the Internet’s ability to interconnect 
computers to each other.  
64 Id. at 1332.  The Eighth Circuits five part test includes: (1) the nature and quality of 
the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quality of the contacts; (3) the relationship 
between the contacts and the cause of action; (4) the interest of the forum state; (5) the 
convenience of the parties.   
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Maritz.  First, the Court concludes that the nature and quality of contacts 
provided by the maintenance of a website on the Internet are of a different 
nature and quality than other means of contact with the forum state.65  This 
conclusion flows from the Court’s limited understanding of electronic mail 
and Internet use, rather than from the actual facts of this case and the 
actions of the defendant.  The Court finds the website’s ability to respond to 
each and every person who accesses the site evidence of Cybergold’s intent 
to reach out to all Internet users everywhere, thus establishing purposeful 
availment and sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction.66  Secondly, the 
Court’s opinion introduces the concept of a passive web site but reasons this 
distinction irrelevant as any website on the Internet demonstrates an intent 
to reach all Internet users.67 
C.  THE DISTRICT COURT’S REMEDY IN ZIPPO 
 
The infant jurisprudence birthed in 1996 cried out for more space.  The 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania responded in 
January 1997 when it renovated the house of personal jurisdiction with the 
                                                 
65 Id. at 1333. 
66 Id. at 1333. 
67Id. at 1333. Cybergold introduced the concept of passive web sites by characterizing 
its website as passive.  The Court disagreed with Cybergold’s reasoning:  “CyberGold's 
posting of information about its new, up-coming service through a website seeks to develop 
a mailing list of internet users, as such users are essential to the success of its service. 
Clearly, CyberGold has obtained the website for the purpose of, and in anticipation that, 
Internet users, searching the Internet for websites, will access CyberGold's website and 
eventually sign up on CyberGold's mailing list. Although CyberGold characterizes its 
activity as merely maintaining a “passive website,” its intent is to reach all internet users, 
regardless of geographic location.”  
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addition of a new sliding scale to be used in evaluating minimum contacts 
based on Internet activity.68 
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.arose from a trademark 
infringement action, brought under the Lanham Act69, by a frequent 
enforcer of its trademarks, Zippo Manufacturing Company, the 
Pennsylvania manufacturer of “Zippo” tobacco lighters.70  Zippo 
Manufacturing complained that Zippo Dot Com, a California-based Internet 
news service, infringed on the Zippo trademark by use of domain names, 
including the name “Zippo.”71  Zippo Dot Com moved to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction arguing it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania.72  Zippo Manufacturing argued that Zippo Dot Com’s web 
site was accessible to Pennsylvania residents and Pennsylvania residents 
were subscribers to the news service through the Internet site73, thus Zippo 
                                                 
68 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
69 See id. at 1121; see also the Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127. 
70 Id.  See e.g. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
71 Id. at 1121-22. (Zippo Dot Com obtained the exclusive right to use the domain 
names “zippo.com”, “zippo.net”, and “zipponews.com”.  Zippo Dot Com operated a web 
site which contained information about the company, advertisements and an application to 
become a subscriber to the news service.  Through the use of the word “Zippo” in the 
domain name, activity on the site generates the use of the word “Zippo” in numerous 
locations on the company’s web site and in many downloads and messages sent from and 
posted on the web site.) 
72 Id. at 1121. 
73 Id. All of Zippo Dot Com’s contacts with Pennsylvania occurred over the Internet.  
The web site was accessible nationally.  Zippo Dot Com had approximately 140,000 
subscribers worldwide, and approximately 2% of the subscribers, 3000, were Pennsylvania 
residents.  In addition, Zippo Dot Com had entered into seven agreements with Internet 
Service Providers in Pennsylvania.   
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Dot Com had sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania to allow for 
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Zippo Dot Com.74 
The Zippo Court’s analysis again begins at the “Constitutional 
touchstone” of minimum contacts, recognizing the role of forseeability and 
“reaching out” in the determination of purposeful availment.75  Then, 
relying specifically on the 1996 trilogy of trademark infringement cases76, 
the Court devises a sliding scale to be applied to evaluate the nature and 
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet77.  
                                                 
74 Id. at 1122.  The Court holds that Zippo Dot Com would not be subject to general 
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, thus narrowing their inquiry to whether the defendant has 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, whether the claim asserted arises out of the 
defendant’s contacts, and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
is reasonable.  
75 Id. at 1123.   
76 See supra note 30.  See also Panavision Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
77 See id. at 1123-24.  The Court textually explains a sliding scale used to differentiate 
between activity on web sites.  The graphic used below is a visual interpretation of the 
Court’s textual description of the scale. 
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The sliding scale demonstrates the spectrum of a defendant’s business 
activity on the Internet.78  On one end of the scale, the Court describes 
situations where businesses clearly conduct business on the Internet through 
contracting with foreign residents and the repeated and knowing 
transmission of computer files through the Internet.79The Court opines that 
defendants with activity falling at this end of the scale are subject to 
personal jurisdiction.  At the opposite end of the scale, the Court describes 
passive web sites which provide information only to Internet users and are 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  Citing Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. Supp. 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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not sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction.80  The Court 
then describes the “middle ground” of Internet activity, a space occupied by 
interactive sites wherein the user and host computer can exchange 
information, which requires the court to examine the nature of activity on 
the individual site to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
is proper.81 
The sliding scale confirms the outcome of minimum contacts analysis 
on Internet-based activity that is either predominantly passive or 
overwhelmingly active and interactive.  As in prior cases of mail or 
telephone communication between remote parties, the level and nature of 
the activity controls the jurisdictional analysis.82  If a defendant uses the 
Internet to attract foreign customers and contacts then continues to deal with 
the out-of-state entity through the Internet or otherwise, the traditional basis 
for personal jurisdiction is formed.  Likewise, if the defendant does nothing 
more than make information available to the general public, through the 
Internet or through traditional advertising, the test for personal jurisdiction 
is likely not met as the activity does not demonstrate purposeful availment.  
The passive and active ends of the Zippo sliding scale contribute nothing to 
the established understanding of minimum contacts and purposeful 
availment.  It is the vast mid-section of the scale, the interactive web sites, 
                                                 
80 Id. Citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
81 Id. Citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
82 See supra  note 62. 
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that present the difficult questions. 
D. THE ISSUE OF POST-ZIPPO DESTABILIZATION 
The Zippo Court reasoned its scale was a new approach to personal 
jurisdiction analysis developed to intercept the “global revolution looming 
on the horizon”, thus staging its own opinion as the next step in a 
progression of personal jurisdiction law83. However, the Zippo Court’s 
creation and application of the scale fails to offer any new approach to 
personal jurisdiction analysis.  In fact, the scale itself has led to more 
confusion as courts have tried to comprehensively wedge Internet-based 
contacts questions into the inadequate and poorly structured scale, 
essentially over-building and over-crowding the addition to the house of 
personal jurisdiction.  
 
1. The Structural Stress ofZippo’s Progeny 
 
The renovated house of personal jurisdiction has become an attractive 
gathering place for courts and litigants wrestling with motions to dismiss 
predicated on Internet-based contacts.84  Specifically, crowds have gathered 
                                                 
83 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)(“As 
technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for 
jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase.”.). The Zippo Court also quotes Burger King 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) for the principle that physical presence in the forum is 
not required for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  
84 See e.g. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 
WL 3203969 (E.D.Mich., Oct 31, 2007)(NO. 07-CV-13207); Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL 
3012968 (M.D.Tenn., Oct 09, 2007)(NO.3:06-0716). 
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in the new addition, and even more specifically, within the particular space 
on the scale, the middle section, ascribed to an interactive, commercial web 
presence.85  Despite the fact that the Zippo sliding scale is the creation of a 
federal district court, many courts began to import the test into decisions 
invoking a website as a predicate for personal jurisdiction.86  Discussion of 
the scale  emerged in all of the circuits at the time of the scale’s creation in 
1999.  Reference to the scale has continued through the present,however, 
some circuits have been reluctant to affirmatively adopt the scale.87   Other 
circuits have been less reticent.88 
                                                 
85 See supra chart page 21. 
86 See e.g. Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 (E.D.Mich., Oct 31, 2007)(NO. 07-
CV-13207 (The court evaluates the question of personal jurisdiction regarding a California 
Company that advertises its product through a website which is accessible to Michigan 
residents but does not allow for purchases online). 
87 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Panavision Int’l, 
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring “something more” than a passive 
website with advertising and contact information to indicate defendant purposefully 
directed activity at forum state; “something more” may be established if the plaintiff can 
establish the effects test); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002); Noegen Corp. v. 
Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002) (The presence of a website that is 
“interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the 
state” is sufficient to show purposeful availment); Toys R Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 
F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring the defendant had knowledge demonstrated by “directly 
targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state 
via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts.”); Ginsburg v. Dinicola, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41418 (D. Mass. June 7, 2007) (ten decisions from this circuit cite the 
Zippo scale but the Circuit has neither elaborated or adopted the scale); Abbot Labs v. 
Mylan Pharms, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13782 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006) (district court 
decisions from the 7th circuit have not adopted the Zippo scale; however the district courts 
weigh the presence of the website into the analysis, placing significant emphasis on how 
much control the defendant has in designing, maintaining, and updating the website); Baker 
v. Carnival Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85114 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006) (district courts 
in the 11th Circuit have focused on evaluating continuous and systematic contacts perhaps 
sustained through Internet activity); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 
F.Supp. 2d 27 (1998) (seven cases from the D.C. Cir. have cited Zippo but only one 
District court case has textually adopted the scale). 
88 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002) (4th 
Deleted: has
Deleted: from
Deleted: ; 
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The 4th Circuit recognized the Internet-based contacts question invoked 
an existing controversy between the traditional minimum contacts analysis 
and the effects test developed through Calder v. Jones89 and applied in 
cases of intentional tort actions.90  When the plaintiff alleges an intentional 
tort via use of a website, the two tests coalesce around the nexus of the 
Internet activity.  In ALS Scan, the plaintiffs alleged a Georgia-based 
Internet Service Provider subjected itself to personal jurisdiction in 
Maryland by enabling a website owner to publish photographs on the 
Internet, staging arguments from the traditional contacts perspective and the 
effects test perspective.91  Given that the contact arguments were centered 
on Internet activity, the Circuit Court invoked the Zippo sliding scale, 
stating its adoption of the scale while creating a new test which essentially 
imports the Zippo scale into a Calder-like effects test.92  The Fourth Circuit 
test adopting the Zippo scale provides a court can exercise personal 
                                                                                                                            
Circuit adopts the Zippo scale but creates a test for personal jurisdiction that combines the 
Zippo scale and the test used in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  Thus, a court may 
find personal jurisdiction when:  (1) the defendant directs electronic activity into the state, 
(2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the state, 
and (3) that activity creates a potential cause of action in the state); Lakin v. Prudential 
Securities, Inc., 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003) (the Zippo scale is properly used in cases 
where specific jurisdiction is alleged but the Zippo scale alone is not sufficient when 
general jurisdiction is alleged to exist); Soma Med. Int’l v. Std. Chtd. Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 
(10th Cir. 1999); Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Best 
Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2nd Cir. 2007) (using Zippo scale not as a separate 
analytical framework but as a tool to decide whether a defendant has transacted business in 
the forum). 
89 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 at 787 (1984).   
90 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002). 
91 Id. at 707. 
92 See id. at 714. 
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jurisdiction over a person outside of the forum when that person (1) directs 
electronic activity into the state, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging 
in business or other interactions within the forum, and (3) that activity 
creates, in a person within the forum, a potential cause of action cognizable 
within under the laws of the forum.93  The test devised by the Fourth Circuit 
substitutes an intent analysis for the Zippo scale’s determination of website 
interactivity.94  As applied, the test places websites used to intentionally 
direct electronic commercial activity into the forum into the interactive arm 
of the scale.95  However, the Fourth Circuit’s professed adoption of the 
Zippo scale arguably adds no dimension to the already one-dimensional 
                                                 
93 Id. at 714. (“Thus, adopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a State 
may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State 
when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent 
of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, 
in a person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's courts. 
Under this standard, a person who simply places information on the Internet does not 
subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is transmitted 
and received. Such passive Internet activity does not generally include directing electronic 
activity into the State with the manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions 
in the State thus creating in a person within the State a potential cause of action cognizable 
in courts located in the State); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 at 787 (1984) (Under 
Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based upon: (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed 
at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and which the defendant 
knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state.) 
94 Id.  
95 See id. at 714; see also Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin v. Baldwin, LLP, 518 F. Supp. 
2d 688 (D.S.C. 2007).  A South Carolina law firm sued a Texas law alleging breach of co-
counsel and fee sharing agreements and seeking to clarify, reform, or rescind such 
agreements.  Following the removal of case on diversity grounds, the Texas law firm 
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer case to 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.  The Motley Rice court noted, 
“ALS Scan provides some support to Plaintiffs' argument that the court has personal 
jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiffs and Defendant communicated with each other during 
their nineteen year relationship in which they served as co-counsel, and Plaintiffs now have 
a potential cause of action against Defendant for breach of contract.”  Id. at 695.   
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nature of the middle portion of the scale since activity and intent measure 
the same element of the defendant’s conduct, measuring the defendant’s 
acts to purposefully engage persons in the forum. 
The Fifth Circuit also crowded into the new room in the house of 
personal jurisdiction by crafting the Zippo sliding scale into a test relying on 
commercial traffic.96 In Mink, the defendant company did not take purchase 
orders through their website, thus no interactive commercial activity could 
be conducted through the site.97 The website at issue was essentially a 
bulletin board that merely posted information about the defendant’s 
products.98 By employing the scale to resolve the personal jurisdiction 
question, the Fifth Circuit created its own version of Zippo which provided 
that if the website in question allows visitors to purchase products and 
services online, the Court will exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
                                                 
96 See Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We find the 
reasoning of Zippo is persuasive and adopt it in this Circuit.”) 
97 Id.  Mink was a Texas resident and furniture salesman. In January 1997, Mink 
claimed that he began to develop a computer program designed to track information on 
sales made and opportunities missed on sales not made. On May 13, 1997, Mink applied 
for a patent.  Mink claimed that in June 1997 he was approached by a Colorado resident, 
Stark, whom he eventually shared information with regarding his computer program.  
Between June 1997 and October 1997, Stark allegedly shared all of Mink's ideas and 
information about the program with Middlebrook. According to Mink's complaint, 
Middlebrook and two companies, AAAA Development and Profitsystems, conspired to 
copy Mink's copyrighted and patent-pending program and create an identical system of 
their own for financial gain.  AAAA Development is a Vermont corporation with its 
principal place of business in Vermont. Middlebrook is a Vermont resident. Neither AAAA 
Development nor Middlebrook own property in Texas. The company had advertised in a 
national furniture trade journal and maintained a website advertising its sales management 
software on the Internet. 
98 Id. at 336. 
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defendant.99  However, the analysis employed by the Circuit Court did not 
require the use of the scale.  A simple factual analysis of purposeful 
availment would have rendered the same result.100 
Implementation of the Zippo sliding scale has led to a confusing array of 
decisions which demonstrate the gimmickry of the scale.  In cases where the 
issue of personal jurisdiction centers on product sales between states, the 
court has invoked Zippo when the company had a website which either 
advertised or sold products, despite other evidence of contact between the 
defendant and the forum state.101  In the product cases, the court relies on 
the traditional device of the amount of revenue from product sales, despite 
the invocation of Zippo by the litigants or the court, to determine the issue 
                                                 
99 Id. “ … AAAA’s website does not allow consumers to order or purchase products 
and services online.”  See also Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 31, 
2007) (No. 07-CV-13207) (evaluating defendant’s presence in the forum, the court notes 
the defendant has sold less than $500 worth of products in the forum); Tamboro v. 
Dworkin, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 04 C 3317) (holding that a 
website which allows visitors to access information about canine pedigrees is not 
interactive because it does not allow communication regarding products and services). 
100 See id. See also Bensusan Restaurant Corp v. King, 937 F. Supp 295 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) and supra notes 41-47. 
101 See e.g. George Kessel Intern. Inc. v. Classic Wholesales, Inc., 2007 WL 3208297 
(D. Ariz., Oct 30, 2007)(NO.CV-07-323-PHXSMM) (holding the defendant’s website was 
“passive”, lacking the “additional conduct” which would place it on the interactive end of 
the scale; however, the court ignores other communications between the parties which 
potentially establish purposeful availment); Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 
(E.D.Mich., Oct 31, 2007)(NO. 07-CV-13207)  (court employs the Zippo scale and rests 
interactivity decision on amount of commercial revenues from the forum despite the 
evidence showing the California defendant had no commercial contact with the forum 
state); Premedics, Inc. v. Zoll Medical Corp., 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D.Tenn., Oct 09, 
2007)(NO.3:06-0716); Beightler v. Produckte Fur Die Medizin, 2007 WL2713907 (N.D. 
Ohio Sep. 17, 2007)(NO. 3:07C1604) (appellate court reversing district court decision that 
defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction because the defendant’s website fell to 
the passive end of the scale when facts of the case demonstrated the defendant hacked into 
the plaintiff’s website intending to pirate information and directly contacted the plaintiff). 
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of presence in the forum.102  A product site that does not generate revenue 
of a substantial amount is not deemed to be an interactive site when set 
upon the sliding scale.103 The scale has also been argued and employed 
when the defendant’s site is not commercial in nature.104  Courts and 
litigants seem to overlook the basic logic of contacts analysis when 
confronted with an Internet-based business or communication between the 
parties through electronic mail.105 Despite the lack of any commercial 
Internet activity, Zippo is applied in the analysis and the court finds the 
                                                 
102 See e.g. Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 31, 2007) (No. 07-
CV-13207); Tamboro v. Dworkin, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 04 C 
3317). 
103 See supra note 101. 
104See Vax-D Medical Technologies, LLC v. Allied Health Management, LTD., 2006 
WL 4847740 (M.D.Fla., Mar 14, 2006)(NO. 804-CV-1617-T-26TGW)(the defendant’s 
website is a referral site that directs users to chiropractors who employ the VAX-D 
technique); Chicago Architecture Foundation v. Domain Magic, LLC, 2007 WL 3046124 
(N.D.Ill., Oct 12, 2007)(NO. 07 C 764) (defendant created website portal specifically 
designed to pirate plaintiff’s website hits in order to create advertising revenues; the court 
cites to Zippo and places the defendant’s website on the Zippo scale despite the absence of 
any commercial traffic between the plaintiff and defendant).  
105 See Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F.Supp.2d 688, D.S.C., Jul 
30, 2007 (NO. C.A.2:07-01368-PMD)(two law firms litigated fee sharing contracts after 19 
years of working together on class action litigation; the district court follows the 4th Circuit 
in applying Zippo through test stated in ALS Scan to find that the defendant’s web 
presence was not enough to establish “purposeful availment”); Dearwater v. Bond 
Mfg.Co., 2007 WL 2745321 (D.Vt., Sep 19, 2007)(NO. 1:06-CV-154)(plaintiff brought a 
wrongful termination lawsuit against defendant employer Bond Mfg. The plaintiff acquired 
the job through e-mails in response to advertisements on Craigslist and CareerBuilder.com.  
Defendant Bond has no connection to the forum state and the plaintiff’s only basis for 
asserting personal jurisdiction was the defendant’s advertisements on national websites.  
The plaintiff argued the Zippo scale should apply, using the job search sites (which are at 
the most active end of the Zippo scale) as a basis to assert personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant). 
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website is passive, lacking the “something more” required to find 
purposeful availment.106 
2. The House Destabilized 
The Zippo sliding scale has had the reverse effect on personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence.  Rather than enhancing the house of personal 
jurisdiction, the scale has directed courts and parties to a less stable area of 
the house, a room not supported by the original place-based structure.  The 
house of personal jurisdiction has been destabilized by the Zippo 
renovations.  
The original posture for the scale followed the reasoning of courts 
which relied on the newness of Internet activity.107  The Internet was 
described in terms of its ephemeral existence online, with devices now as 
commonplace as electronic mail described as different than posted mail and 
telephone calls through an 800 number because electronic mail does not 
place a person in actual contact with another person in the forum state.108  
Thus, the predicate for the Zippo scale was based on the concept of non-
contact rather than on the longstanding concepts of minimum contacts and 
                                                 
106 See Zombech v. Amada, 2007 WL 4105231 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2007)(NO.CIV.A. 
06-953) (in a products liability case against a foreign component part manufacturer, 
plaintiff converts a stream of commerce analysis into a Zippo analysis by alleging the 
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum when the defendant has a website 
that allows e-mail comment, despite no other evidence of  contact with the forum state). 
107 See supra note 61-63 and text accompanying notes 52,54 and 62. See also Bensusan 
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, 
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. Supp. 1257 
(6th Cir. 1996). 
108 See supra note 62. 
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purposeful availment.  The early decisions identified the issue of Internet-
based contacts as matters of first impression, distinct from the traditional 
personal jurisdiction case.109  By so doing, courts have turned away from 
traditional place-based analysis and attempted to create a new arm of 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for Internet-based contacts. 
This new analysis is, by definition, not based on the traditional tenets of 
territoriality and contacts.  Given the historical import of territory and 
contact110, a new analysis for Internet-based contacts which attempts to 
define itself separately finds itself inadequately supported.  The new 
approach’s lack of architectural support is demonstrated through the post 
Zippo decisions themselves.111  A court may invoke the scale only as a 
means to describe the Internet basis for the jurisdictional argument.112  The 
decisions often then revert to a more traditional contacts analysis, relying on 
the secure ground of revenues, contracts, and communication despite 
sometimes lengthy discussions of the passivity or interactivity of the 
website.113  In essence, when the courts invoke the scale, they find 
themselves in a destabilized portion of the house of personal jurisdiction 
and they move the case onto more stable ground.   
                                                 
109 See supra  notes 61-63 and text accompanying notes 52,54 and 62. 
110 See supra notes 19, 33.  
111See e.g. Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 9, 2007)(NO.3:06-
0716) 
112 See e.g. Words Music, LLC v. Priddis Music, Inc., 2007 WL 32321835 (M.D. 
Tenn., Oct. 30 3007)(NO. 3:07CV0502)  
113 See e.g. Chicago Architectural Foundation v. Domain Magic, LLC, 2007 WL 
3046124 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 12, 2007)(NO. 07 C 764).  
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III. UTILIZING THE PLACE THEORY FRAMEWORK IN 
INTERNET-BASED CONTACTS ANALYSIS 
 
Place theory is the theory of personal jurisdiction created through 
the early law of Pennoyer and International Shoe.114 The core of place 
theory is the understanding that for a defendant to be subject to personal 
jurisdiction within the forum, the defendant must have some contact 
with the territory of the forum.115   Although contacts have been 
traditionally viewed as variations of physical contact, such as actual 
physical presence through travel, sales or corporate operations, or 
telephone, facsimile, or mail correspondence, the core value in a 
contacts analysis is a “reaching out” from the defendant’s forum to the 
plaintiff’s forum.116  Since jurisdictional analysis is largely a fact-based 
analysis, tying contact analysis to place provides courts a framework 
under which the defendant’s activity can be evaluated and weighed 
against other factors in the overall jurisdictional analysis.  When 
electronic contacts through websites are considered untethered to a 
physical place, courts are deprived of the framework for evaluating the 
defendant’s purposeful availment.   
 
                                                 
114 See supra notes 19, 33. 
115 See supra  notes 19-24.  
116 See supra  note 38. 
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A. ATTRIBUTES OF PLACE THEORY 
 
The place theory of personal jurisdiction is marked by certain attributes 
which combine the historical roots of territorial jurisdiction with the 
appropriate flexibility necessary to the modern commercial context. First, 
place theory is rooted in the traditional jurisprudence of personal 
jurisdiction.117  Second, place theory, because it is rooted in contacts theory, 
applies flexibly to almost all situations where personal jurisdiction is raised 
in the context of commercial and non-commercial interactions.  Third, place 
theory is able to uniquely respond to the new realities of interaction 
between remote parties through the Internet because it relies on an 
established framework for jurisdictional analysis. 
The first attribute of place theory is a basis in established 
jurisprudence.118  The theory recognizes that the entire concept of in 
personam jurisdiction has rested across centuries on the concept of 
territorialism: the idea that a forum’s reach extends to its borders and the 
forum has a duty to protect its citizens from harm.119  This core concept has 
evolved into a test based on contacts with the forum120and the reach of the 
forum has extended with the development of the contacts test.121  As courts 
expanded contacts to include more remote interaction, courts shifted the 
                                                 
117 See supra  notes 19-24. 
118.See id. 
119 See supra  notes 17, 19 
120 See supra  note 33. 
121 See e.g.Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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focus to whether the contacts demonstrate a defendant purposefully availed 
itself of the benefits and protections of the forum.122  Thus the place theory 
framework for personal jurisdiction analysis was created around the 
coalescing concepts of presence, contacts, and purposeful availment.  
Place theory framework provided the necessary flexibility to deal with 
over fifty years of commercial progress in the Twentieth Century.123   The 
issue of purposeful availment has been measured in the modern context of 
remote communications, such as facsimile transmissions, telephone calls, 
mail order business, and other devices of commercial communication that 
allow parties to develop contacts without travel to the forum.124 When the 
framework relies on purposeful contacts to assess jurisdiction, it is able to 
flex around technology.  If the framework were less flexible, it would have 
required change with each Twentieth Century advancement, generating a 
new line of analysis when fax communications replaced posted mail and 
mail order sales replaced the traveling salesperson.  
The Internet has brought what are arguably the most significant 
communications changes of the late Twentieth and early Twenty-First 
centuries.   As fax replaced mail and mail order replaced traveling 
salespersons, electronic mail now makes all other forms of communication 
dated and Internet commerce now offers conveniences other sales 
                                                 
122 See supra note 33. 
123 See supra note 36. 
124 See e.g. Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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approaches cannot offer.  However, the underlying act between the parties 
in an electronic communication or an Internet sale is the same.  In all 
scenarios there is a reaching out from one party to the other through some 
means of contact.  The reaching out is the measure of purposeful availment.  
If a defendant’s telephone contacts to the forum state can demonstrate 
purposeful availment, so can his electronic mail.  If a defendant company 
purposefully avails itself of the forum through mailing a catalog and order 
form, then a defendant company which uses the Internet for direct sales is 
purposefully availing itself of the forums where it makes sales to customers 
within the forum.  The devices for sales and communications have become 
more complicated but the behavioral analysis should remain with the same 
framework.  Whether the court finds itself analyzing telephone calls or 
electronic mail transmissions, it should still be analyzing whether the 
defendant’s pattern of commercial behavior suggests the defendant acted 
purposefully to engage in commerce within the forum.   
The fallacy of the Zippo scale is its attempt to recast the place theory 
framework in the context of the Internet.  The sliding scale has been 
erroneously adopted as a new framework for analyzing situations where the 
parties dealt through the Internet.  At the most, the scale has defined a way 
to measure purposeful availment through Internet sites by determining 
whether the site in question is passive or interactive.  An interactive site 
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occupies the most purposeful end of the scale, creating what is in essence a 
presumption that interactive web sites subject the site operators to personal 
jurisdiction in any forum the site accesses.  However, a place-based analysis 
of Internet activity, without consideration of the sliding scale, would yield 
the same result as the quantity and quality of the contacts would 
demonstrate purposeful availment.  Likewise, the passive end of the scale is 
equally superfluous as passive web sites indicate low contact and little 
effort to reach out to a forum.  The issue using either the place theory 
framework or the sliding scale is the determination of jurisdiction when the 
commercial interaction falls some place in between passive and active. To 
the extent the scale is used to identify cases which fall into this more 
complex area, it can be helpful.  However, the scale itself offers no 
framework for resolving the jurisdictional questions generated by activity 
falling in the middle of the scale.   
 
B.  PLACE THEORY EXEMPLIFIED IN THE MODERN CONTEXT 
 
 
The absence of an analytical framework in the Zippo scale is 
exemplified in cases which struggle to apply the scale. Consider the 
following example of a case involving conduct through an Internet web site. 
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MedicOne125 is a Tennessee corporation that markets and distributes 
automated external defibrillators (AEDs).  As part of its business, 
MedicOne offers programs and support services to AED purchasers and 
users through an Internet web site. MedicOne manages its online 
support services through a patent-pending “three prong readiness” web-
based interface system developed by MedicOne called the “AED 
Manager.”  The AED Manager checks the status of participating AEDs, 
and sends automated “action item” emails to customers to have their 
AED units tested for readiness. MedicOne operates a website that lists 
general information about the company, including contact information 
and a description of its services. The MedicOne website contains an 
access point to the AED Manager, which users may access only after 
entering in a correct login name and password.  
 
In July 2002, MedicOne and CALL Medical Corporation (CALL), a 
Massachusetts-based company that manufactures and markets AEDs, 
entered into a contract whereby MedicOne agreed to provide certain 
CALL customers with support services, including the AED Manager.  
In 2004, CALL took steps to reverse engineer and copy the AED 
Manager, ultimately creating and advertising its own web-based 
interactive database application. According to MedicOne, CALL 
engaged ProM Management to reproduce the MedicOne web-based 
support system.  
 
ProMaccessed MedicOne’s Internet website, and navigated onto the 
AED Manager portion of the website. ProM created an unauthorized test 
account for the AED Manager, an account that is only distributed to 
MedicOne’s own web developers. As a result of establishing a test 
account, CALL and ProM were able to receive the automated “action 
item” emails from the MedicOne system, which is a proprietary 
component of MedicOne’s system. MedicOne contends that by 
improperly logging into the AED Manager using an unauthorized test 
account, and receiving the automated emails, ProM and CALL were 
able to determine the functionality of the AED Manager for the purpose 
of reproducing it.  On September 8, 2004, ProM’s website published a 
statement that it had developed an interactive database application on 
behalf of CALL, called “CALL MD.” CALL made a similar publication 
                                                 
125 The hypothetical case summarized here is based on Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL 
3012968 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 9, 2007)(NO.3:06-0716) which involved allegations against a 
rival company based on the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s intellectual property.  In 
Premedics v. Zoll, the District Court rejected the defendant’s Zippo-based argument it was 
not subject to personal jurisdiction.  
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on its website in October 2004, advertising its CALL MD program.  
 
MedicOne has brought a number of claims against ProM and CALL, 
including claims of conspiracy, misappropriation of trade secrets, 
violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, conversion, violation of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and violation of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act.  
 
CALL argues the Tennessee Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them 
because they have no present connection with the State of Tennessee. 
CALL contends they have no offices, agents or contacts in Tennessee, 
and have never conducted or solicited business in Tennessee. CALL 
further argues that the allegedactivities were all conducted by ProM in 
Louisiana.  MedicOne argues that CALL’s Internet website is accessible 
in Tennessee and has been accessed by Tennessee residents, thus 
supporting the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over CALL. 
 
 
In cases where the Defendant’s website is argued as the basis for the 
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the temptation is for courts to turn 
to the Zippo sliding scale to determine whether the website itself 
demonstrates the appropriate level of interactivity to demonstrate 
purposeful availment.126  However, the sliding scale is misdirection in cases 
where the Internet activity involves purposeful behavior.127  If the court 
                                                 
126 See Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 9, 2007)(NO.3:06-
0716) (“Undoubtedly, the determination of purposeful availment becomes more 
challenging when applied to situations involving the use of the internet. The prevalence and 
scope of the internet allows individuals to communicate, conduct business, or casually 
browse across state lines and international borders without leaving their desk. Information 
once part and parcel to transactions, such as knowledge of another party's physical location, 
is no longer a prerequisite to communication. Federal courts have applied a specific 
analysis in determining whether a defendant's internet activity constitutes purposeful 
availment, commonly referred to as the ‘Zippo sliding scale.’”) 
127 See id. at 11(“However, the sliding scale approach is not applicable in every case 
merely because facts touch on internet activity. Rather, the Zippo analysis is appropriately 
applied in personal jurisdiction inquiries where the facts center on the defendant's activities 
conducted through its own website.”) 
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utilizes the sliding scale analysis and looks to the number of hits on CALL’s 
website from Tennessee residents and the amount of revenue received from 
sales in Tennessee, the court may completely overlook the fact that CALL 
intentionally accessed MedicOne’s website for the purpose of reverse 
engineering MedicOne’s web-based product.128 
The facts of the hypothetical case parallel a pre-Internet scenario where 
one vendor travels to another state to buy a competitor’s product, then takes 
the product back to its own shop for use as a model to create a rival product.  
In the pre-Internet scenario, the acts of traveling to another state and 
purchasing a product for an improper purpose would be sufficient to 
demonstrate purposeful availment.  The fact that modern actors use the 
Internet as a means for the same end should not alter the analysis. 
If the court were to focus on CALL’s website and its placement on the 
sliding scale, the result of the case may be highly illogical.  It is possible 
that when placed on the sliding scale, the CALL website would fail to meet 
the necessary level of interactivity to establish personal jurisdiction over 
CALL in Tennessee.129  A misdirected focus on the defendant’s website can 
overtake the heart of the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant’s purposeful 
                                                 
128 See id. at 12(“ …Defendants' activities on their own website are irrelevant for 
purposes of determining personal jurisdiction. Instead, the issue at hand focuses on the 
unauthorized actions taken by the Defendants against Plaintiff's website. In short, this is a 
case involving computer hacking, and therefore, personal jurisdiction turns on the tortuous 
injury that Defendants allegedly inflicted upon Premedics.”) 
129 In fact, if the defendant is aware of the sliding scale prior to designing the website, 
he can design a website that meets the description of a passive website on the sliding scale. 
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act.  When the same facts are analyzed through the place theory framework, 
the court would focus on first determining the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state, then on whether those contacts demonstrate purposeful 
availment.130  In this hypothetical, the contacts include CALL’s entry into a 
contract with MedicOne, a Tennessee company, CALL’s access of 
MedicOne’s website, CALL’s receipt of e-mails from MedicOne’s site, and 
any and all other interactions with MedicOne.  These contacts demonstrate 
purposeful availment as CALL’s contact with the MedicOne website, on its 
own and through its agent ProM, were undertaken for the purpose of reverse 
engineering the MedicOne technology.  Under the place theory framework, 
CALL’s actions should be analyzed as the electronic version of a product 
purchase for the same improper motive.131  The place theory framework 
supports the logical conclusion that CALL would be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Tennessee; however the sliding scale analysis may reach the 
opposite result by focusing on CALL’s website rather than its actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
All things new do not require new things. The Zippo sliding scale is 
itself the most compelling example of why functional doctrine should not be 
supplanted to address the societal changes brought forth through 
                                                 
130 See supra  note 33. 
131 See Premedics at 12-16,19 (The Court in Premedics applied the effects test, 
focusing on the tortuous injury the defendant allegedly inflicted on the plaintiff.  Applying 
the effects test, the Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.) 
40 THERE IS A THERE THERE 25-Sep-08 
technology.The scale is a naïve device to categorize Internet sites on a 
linear continuum for the purpose of assessing whether the attributes of a 
website suggest conduct directed at the forum. Despite invocation of the 
scale by courts and litigants as a device for analyzing the forum’s 
constitutional reach, the scale itself offers no framework for evaluating 
purposeful activity within the forum. In contrast, place theory allows courts 
and litigants to analyze an Internet-based contacts case through the vertical 
constitutional framework defined and refined through over one hundred 
years of precedent.  
The addition of the sliding scale onto the house of personal jurisdiction 
already appears dated and the house itself suffers under the structural stress 
of the scale.  Courts should abandon the sliding scale and return to the place 
theory analytical framework when analyzing Internet-based contacts, 
thereby preparing litigants to address the inevitable next technological 
change on the global horizon.   
 
* * * 
 
  
 
